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by Robert L. Latta 
1t has been said that the mind-brain problem is more di伍cultthan any other， in any 
field of inquiry. 1t has been said， too， that no solution is possible. Neither assertion is 
correct. 1n fact， the solution comes fairly easily once several points which apparently 
ha ve escaped notice are taken into account. The crux of the matter is this: 1n effect， 
in stating the problem， a theorist makes two very different presentations of one and the 
same item. The one presentation， that of the neural activity in the田町 isof a typ己
employable in any connection whatever: for instance， in presenting or representing a 
hippopotamus， a bus， or a fire. The other， that of the experience， isof a unique type 
employed and indeed employable in just one special connection-viz.， in presenting an 
experienc巴 Thefact that one term of the problem， the experience in question， unlike 
the other， the corresponding neural activity， occurs in time but not in space and is had in 
a certain sense or way by a subject of experience poses a residual di伍culty. 1t is quite 
possible， however， to remove this di伍culty，for the mind-brain problem lies at a lower 
conceptual level， as it were， than the objective/subjective distinction， but this entails that 
it is not necessary to conceive the term in question as an experience， and that it is an 
error to run the mind-brain problem and that of the objective/subjective distinction to・
gether. Quite apart from this， itis possible to explain why the term in question， concεived 
as an experience， has the two characteristics in question. 
1n the folIowing， aI descriptions of neurological phenomena， such as“in the auditory 
area of the brain，" are to be taken to be stand-ins for full， accurate descriptions， which 
for the most part are not available at present. 
1magine that a man， henceforth to be calIed “the questioner，" gathers three others 
together in a room-a cIarinetist， a neuroscientist， and a metaphysician. He asks the 
cIarinetist to play a four-measure theme， asks the neuroscientist to describe the neural 
activity which in response occurs in the auditory area of the m巴taphysician'sbrain and 
receives a full and accurate reply， and then asks the metaphysician the following question: 
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Precisely what is the connection between the neural activity just described and the audi-
tory experience you just had， or to put it another way， the sound you just heard? Let 
us call this the four-person situation. 
Now imagine the following: Th巴 question巴rgathers four others-the clarinetist， the 
neuroscientist， a music-lover named Shimano， and the metaphysician. The clarinetist 
plays， the neuroscientist describes the neural activity which occurs in the auditory area of 
Shimano's brain， and then the questioner asks the metaphysician: Precisely what is the 
connection between the neural activity just described and the auditory experience Shimano 
just had， or to put it another way， the sound she just heard? Let us call this the fIve-
per回 nsituation. It is essentiaIly the same as the four-person one. In both cases alike， 
essentially， the question is: What is the connection between this neural acti vity and that 
auditory experience or sound? 
It is to be assumed that Shimano's experience is a musical one which goes well beyond 
the bare experience of hearing a sound， and， if only in that musical experience has a 
large intellectual component， that the corresponding neural activity goes well beyond the 
auditory ar四 ofher brain. No attempt shall be made， however， to take this complication 
into account. 
It is possible to put the question more loosely， as follows: What is the connection 
between the neural activity which occurs in the auditory area of a person's brain on a 
given occasion， and the auditory experience or sound which corresponds to it? 
In the following， for the most part， the discussion shall be conducted in terms of the 
five-person situation. 
The question just described serves， of course， to iIlustrate a much broader one. This 
may be described as the question of the connection between neural activity on the one 
hand and experience， consciousness， or mental life (or mental phenomena or events) on 
the other， and may be called the mind-brain problem. Needless to say， itis not al neural 
activity but only that of a certain type (or perhaps more accurately， certain types) that is 
in question here. A great deal of neural activity， even in the brain， has to do with the 
regulation of body temperature and such things， though it is cIear that it is not entirely 
insulated from neural activity of the type in question. 
The thesis that a particular occurrence of neural activity of the type in question and 
the corresponding experience are numericaIly identical， that they are simply the same 
thing， shall be called th巴 identitythesis. 
Let us assume that the identity thesis is true. Many things fal into place imme-
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diately. The occurrence of one term， in the five-person situation， the neural activity in 
the auditory area of Shimano's brain or her auditory experience， is a necessary condition 
of the occurrence of the other in that they are the same thing. They occur simultaneously 
in that they are the same thing. The neural activity varies through time in paraIIel 
with the sound Shimano hears with respect to pitch， loudness， and tone color-the upper 
and lower registers of the clarinet have markedly different tone colors-because， the 
apparent differences notwithstanding， the neural activity and the sound are the same thing. 
For instance， as for loudness， some such paraIIel as the foIIowing obtainsー thoughthis is 
not to say that it is specificaIIy this paraIIel which obtains in fact: As the sound Shimano 
hears becomes louder， the neural activity becomes more intense in physical terms. The 
physical process which begins with the production of physical sound by the clarinetist， 
runs through the operations of Shimano's auditory system-middle ear， inner ear， etc:-and 
brain， and ends with muscular movements in her face and body appears to be cumplete in 
itseIf because it is complete in itseIf. These muscular movements appear equaIIy to 
express both neural activity and experience because they do express both， because these 
are the same thing. 
The identity thesis answers the questioner's question simply and directly. 1t entails 
no excursion into metaphysical never-never land. 1t entai1s both that Shimano's auditory 
experience is no more iIlusory， no more unreal， than the neural activity in her brain and 
that in principle， at any rate， itlies equaIIy within the scope of scienti五cinquiry. 
In fact， there is only one thing which does not faI into place immediately: The two 
terms in question appear to be very di妊erentindeed. For the most part， what can be said 
of the neural activity， in terms of watts and ohms， for instance， simply cannot be said of 
the auditory experience， and vice versa. The qualification“for the most part" is necessary 
because with respect to the paraIIels just mentioned， what can be said of the one can be 
said of the other， at least in a way-or at any rate it's quite possible that this is so to a 
greater or lesser extent. Thus， for instance， ifin fact it happens， as proposed above for 
expository purposes， that the physical intensity of the neural activity varies directly with 
the loudness of the sound Shimano h 
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presentation of New York. The act of gesturing downwards from the helicopter at the 
scene shown in the photograph and saying to one's fellow passenger “This is New York" 
also counts as a presentation. Each of these two presentations reIates to New York， in 
an obvious sense. SimilarIy， a photograph taken from the surface of the planet Venus 
which shows a mountain range， accompanied by the identifying statement “This is the 
morning star，" and another which shows a plain， accompanied by the statement “This is 
the evening star，" constitute two presentations， both of which relate to Venus. The 
presentation which consists in a panoramic photograph of New York with the caption 
“New York City" shall be called a represεntation， for it is natural to call it such， but 
the one which consists in gesturing downwards from the helicopter at the scene shown in 
the photograph and saying “This is New York" shall not， for it employs as its material， 
as it were， not a photograph， a drawing， or the like， but rather the item itseIf. 
It is hardly necessary to point out that these de五nitions，if that is the correct descrip-
tion， are lacking in fullness and mathematical precision. They serve nevertheless. 
The neuroscientist describes the gross and fine structure of Shimano's brain and in 
particular of the auditory area， and then describes the neural activity which occurs there 
on the occasion in question. He uses photographs and diagrams and describes physical， 
chemical， and biological transactions in words and mathematical and chemical formulas， 
etc. This shall be calIed the neurological account. 
The neurological account constitutes a presentation and more specificalIy a represen-
tation of the neural activity in question. It identifies and gives substantial information 
about that neural activity. It identifies it as the neural activity which is in question. 
It is not that activity itseIf， but a representation of it. By hypothesis it is fulI and 
accurate， and hence， in making it， itis natural to say “This is the neural activity"-that 
is， natural to say“is" rather than “represents." But of course it is no mistake to say 
‘represents." 
The questioner， for his part， establishes conditions in which it is possible to make a 
presentation of a particular auditory experience， sees to it that one occurs， and makes a 
presentation of it. He gathers the others， asks the clarinetist to play a theme， and then 
refers to“the auditory experience Shimano just had." This presentation gives substantial 
informatlOn about the item in question in that it brings it about that an interIocutor， viz.， 
the metaphysican， knows what kind of item it is and knows in some detail what it is like. 
It shalI be calIed the experiential presentation. It is not， of course， the same thing as 
the auditory experience. It presents出atwhich the auditory experience is. 
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If the identity thesis is true， then the neurological account and the experiential pre-
sentation relate to the same item， for in this case the neural activity in question and the 
auditory experience are the same thing. The neurological account imparts a certain 
conception of that item， in a word， as a pattern of electrochemical activity in “soggy gray 
matter，" to quote one theorist's graphic description， and the experiential presentation ano-
ther very di妊erentconception of it， as an auditory experience. If， then， under the 
assumption of the identity thesis， itis possible to explain why thes巴 twoconceptions di紅白
in just the ways they do and are simi1ar in just the ways they are， this removes the sole 
obstacle to acceptance of this thesis. But this is indeed possible. 
The neurological account represents the neural activity in the auditory area of 
Shimano's brain in the same way in which one represents a hippopotamus， a bus， a fire， 
or any other thing， process， or event which does not constitute neural activity of the type 
i n question: by means of photographs， diagrams， words， mathematical and chemical for-
mulas， etc. Now， stil assuming that the identity thesis is true， let us picture the 
workings of this representation in neurological terms. 1n an obvious sense， itrepresents 
through neural activity in the visual area plus neural activity in the verbal-cognitive 
area of the metaphysician's brain. The neuroscientist's effort at description succeeds， of 
course， only if it has a complex effect of a certain description on the metaphysician's brain. 
1t is essential to note， however， that the neurological account does not represent through a 
duplicate in the auditory area of the metaphysician's brain of the item it represents， the 
neural activity in the auditory area of Shimano's brain. 1n presenting the neurological 
account， the neuroscientist does not ask the clarinetist to play the theme again for the 
metaphysician. 
Needless to say， spoken language has an auditory aspect， and consequently if the 
neuroscientist chooses to communicate by means of it， his representation works in part 
through neural activity in the auditory area of his interlocutor's brain. 1n principle and 
indeed in practice， however， he need not use spoken language， and for present purposes 
it is permissible to assign al1 neural responses to the neuroscientist's utterances to“the 
verbal-cognit 
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which by hypothesis is the same thing as the auditory experience in question， or， in the 
五ve-personone， through a more or less exact duplicate of the very item in question， the 
neural activity in the auditory area of Shimano's brain， in the metaphysician's. In the 
former situation， the questioner brings it about that neural activity occurs in the auditory 
area of his interlocutor the metaphysician's brain， and then refers to“the auditory experi-
ence you just had." But this presentation， of course， works through the neural activity 
just mentioned， though not exclusively through it， for it also works through neural activity 
in the verbal-cognitive area. The latter situation is not essentiaIIy different. Here， the 
questioner brings it about that neural activity occurs in the auditory area of Shimano's 
brain and closely similar neural activity in the same area of the metaphysician's， and it 
is through the latter that the presentation imparts to the metaphysician the more or less 
fuII knowledge it does of the character of Shimano's auditory experien田.
The upshot， then， isthis: In picturing the workings of the neurological account in 
neurological terms， itwilI do to imagine the visual and verbal-cognitive areas lighting up， 
as in a positron emission tomographic (PET) scan， and in picturing those of the experi-
ential presentation， itwilI do to imagine the auditory area lighting up and the verbal-
cognitive area lighting up in a very different pattern. 
This， however， points the way to an explanation， by reference to the identity thesis， 
of the differences and similarities between the two conceptions in question. StilI assuming 
that this thesis is true， to begin with， the very fact that the patterns of neural activity 
through which the neurological account and the experiential presentation work are very 
different su伍cesto account for the fact that the neural activity as it appears in the former 
presentation and the auditory experience as it appears in the latter are very different even 
though in fact they are the same thing. But beyond this， itis not di伍cuItto explain the 
specific di妊erencesand similarities which appear. 
The neurological account gives a fuIl picture of the neural activity in the auditory 
area in the same way in which a zoologist's account gives a fuIl picture of a hippopota-
mus， an engineer's account a fuII picture of a bus， a chemist's account a fuIl picture of a 
fire， etc. In itse!f， it pr 
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On the other hand， the experiential presentation presents the full auditory experience 
in that it does work through th巴 neuralactivity in the auditory area (in the four-person 
situation)， or a duplicate of it (in the five-person one). It gives no picture at al of the 
content of the neural activity because it doesn't work in the right way for this. The 
neural activity is the auditory experience or sound as it appears in a presentation which 
works the same way as a pr巴sentationof a hippopotamus， a bus， or a fire， but the experi-
ential presentation doesn't work this way at all. 1t does， however， give the form of the 
neural activity with respect to those neurological factors which correspond to pitch， loud-
ness， and tone color， in that the sound it presents fully has the same or at any rate an 
equi valent form. 
1t is not surprising that a musical sound is not to be heard in a visual-verbal 
representation of it. 1t is a mistake to scrutinize the neurological account for traces of the 
content of the auditory experience. There are none there， simply in that this account 
does not， to repeat， work through the neural activity in the auditory area which constitutes 
that experience， or a duplicate of it. 
Now for the residual di伍cultymentioned in the introductory paragraph: The auditory 
experience in question， like any other experience， occurs in time but not in space， whereas 
the corresponding neural activity occurs in time and space. The experience， moreover， 
is had by a subject of experience， Shimano， whereas the neural activity is not had-
certainly not in the same way， at any rate. But these two di妊erencessuggest that the 
experienc巴 andthe neural activity are not numerically identical. 
To begin with， there are of course many differences between Shimano's auditory 
experience and the neural activity which corresponds to it. If there were none， there 
would be no mind-brain problem. To point out two additional di妊erencesnot yet con-
sidered， then， does not su伍ceto refute the identity thesis. 
On the other hand， these particular differences go unexplained in the primary argu-
ment， just stated. Ther巴 is，however， a solution. The crux of it is this: The mind-
brain problem， to repeat， lies at a lower conceptual level than the objective/subjective 
distinction. Hence it is not necessary to conceive the term in question， Shimano's auditory 
experience， as an experience in order to state and solve this problem. The di伍culty，
then， appears only if the problem is formulated on a conceptual level higher than 
necessary. 1t is superfluous. 
1t is easy to fall to the supposition that the mind-brain problem is essentially one of 
relating something subjective， experience， to something objective， neural activity， or even 
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that it comes down， quite simply， to the question of the connection between the subjective 
realm and the objective. This is an error. To borrow heavily from P. F. Strawson， 
who shows the way here， itis possible to subtract the objectivejsubjective distinction， 
as it were， from the conceptual scheme， the way of talking and thinking about things， 
which people do in fact employ， and thus arrive at a simplified scheme. To be sure， to 
subtract this distinction is to subtract a great deal. Within a conceptual scheme within 
which the objectivejsubjective distinction does not figure and hence nothing counts as 
subjective， there is no such thing as experience， or an experience， for experience is some-
thing essentially subjective， something that is to be ascribed to a subject of experience. 
There is， moreover， no such thing as a subject of experience， and hence， further， no such 
thing as a person in the ordinary sense， and hence no such thing as other persons or 
myself. Within the simplified scheme， moreover， nothing counts as objective either， and 
thus there is no such thing as the objective world， the world which predates and outlasts 
my experience and that 01 others and turns independently of it， to use expressions which 
cannot be used within this scheme. This， of course， is why the objectivejsubjective 
distinction is in fact employed. 
There is no reason， however， a theorist working within the simplified scheme (who 
of course fai1s to recognize himself or anyone else as a theorist or a person) cannot 
recognize red， blue， color， sounds， sound， pitch， loudness， tone color， odors， tastes， heat 
and cold， pressure， pain and pleasure， beauty and ugliness， humor， what happened， what 
wi1l happen， what might happen， memory， thought， imagination， presentation， and repre-
sentation. To be sure， his understanding of these things is somewhat impoverished as 
compared with ours. For instance， to him sound， that which we conceive as th巴 subjective
phenomenon of sound， is simply something of a certain quality which occurs in time. 
1t is sound more or less in the sense in which a young child understands the term. To 
him， to say that A， an account or description for instance， presents X is simply to say 
this， and not that A presents X to S， a subject. That is to say， he is capable of recog-
nizing that A presents X but incapable of carrying this thought this last step， for lack of 
the objectivejsubjective distinction. To borrow from Strawson a 
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and to answer it as above， or di妊erentlyfor that matter. He can recognize the great 
dissimilarity between the neural activity and the sound， the parallels， the neurological 
account as a representation， a presentation of a sound (his version of the experiential 
presentation， which is a presentation of an experience)， and so on. 
The mind-brain problem， then， stands even after the objectivejsubjective distinction 
has been subtracted away. 1t is indeed essentially a problem of relating sights， sounds， 
pains， thoughts， etc.， to neural activity， but it is not essentially one of relating something 
subjective to something objective. This is why it is possible to alternate between the 
expressions “the auditory experience" and “the sound." The former presupposes the ob-
jectivejsubjective distinction， but the latter d侃 日't.
1n a nutshell， the neural activity is the sound， and it is possible， but not necessary， 
to conceive the sound as an experience. If it is felt that this statement clarifi.es， this is 
because it strips from the mind-brain problem al questions concerning the objectivejsub-
jective distinction. To be sure， this distinction poses an interesting problem in its own 
right， but this problem is not to be confused with the mind-brain problem. 
Nevertheless， itis best， though not strictly necessary， to attempt to explain why the 
two differences in question exist between the item in question as it appears in the 
experiential presentation and as it appears in the neurological account. To this end， it
is necessary to delve into the grounds of the objectivejsubjective distinction. Here too 
Strawson has shown the way. 
1n his lndividuals， Strawson argues with admirable thoroughness and rigor that in 
practice a particular experience， in the sense of a particular which is an experience， or 
vice versa， isascribed to a particular subject of experience， such as Shimano， which is 
conceived to have it in“a logically nontransferable way，" that is， in such a way that it 
does not make sense to assert that a di妊erentsubject might have had it instead， because 
through this procedure it can be assigned a unique place in the one universal system of 
particulars and thereby identifi.ed， and hence can be recognized as a particular. The 
system in question is fundamentally a spatio-temporal one， but a particular experience， as 
of a flash of light which in fact is due to a random discharg巴 inone of the optic nerves 
of a particular 
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or， ifthe brain in which it occurs moves， series of positions. To conceive the item in 
question here as an experience， then， which is to say to recognize it at al， instead of 
simply referring to that sound， is to conceive it as a particular which lacks spatial position 
but is had by the subject of experience Shimano in a logically nontransferable way. For 
detail and depth， the reader is referred to Strawson's lndividuals， and to his review of 
羽Tittgenstein'sPhilosophical lnvestigations. 
The primary argument， to return to it， then， can be generalized to cover al1 experience 
of al1 sorts. With the exception of the di伍cultyjust considered， which can be removed 
in the ways just described in outline， itremoves al obstacles to acceptance of the identity 
thesis and thus may be said to establish its truth. 1t entai1s a picture of the mind-brain 
problem which encapsulates: 1n point of fact， a particular experience and the corresponding 
neural activity are one and the same item. 1n stating the mind.brain problem， a theorist 
presents this item through neural activity of a certain description in the brain of his 
interlocutor， and in the process says “This is the experience I'm talking about." Then he 
proceeds to present it， the same item， through neural activity of a very different descrip-
tion， and in the process says“This is the neural activity I'm talking about." Then he 
proceeds to ask as to the connection between that which appears in the one presentation 
and that which appears in the other， and gives many erroneous answers. 1t occurs to 
him， of course， that the two terms in question might simply be the same thing， but he 
cannot see how this is possible. But at bottom the solution is simple: He has presented 
one item in two different ways. 
That which follows is a list of comments of varied import. 
1n order to solve the mind-brain problem， itis necessary to take into account the two 
presentations described here， the neurological account and the experiential presentation， 
and extremely helpful if not necessary to picture their workings in neurological terms. 
If one fails to take these two presentations into account， and consequently thinks， quite 
simply， in terms of this thing neural activity on the one hand and this thing experience， 
consciousness， or mental life on the other， then the problem becomes unsolvable. Some 
theorists， for instance， attempt to understand how it is that experience arises from neural 
activit 
were. Both these approaches stem from a failure to perceive that two presentations of two 
very di妊erenttypes figure in the problem， and both are futile. 
The impression that experience or consciousness somehow “emerges from" or“is 
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generated by" neural activity arises when unwittingly a theorist superimposes the experien・
tial presentation， as it were， on the neurological account. 1t is like laying one tracing on 
top of another quite different one. The th巴oristwonders how one of the things which 
appear comes out of the other. The question carries a false presupposition and thus is， 
of course， unanswerable. The solution is to see that that which one faces， as it were， 
is not one presentation of two things， but rather two different presentations of one thing. 
There is， to repeat， only one thing in al the universe which it is possible to present 
through itself， in the neurological sense: neural activity of the type in question here. The 
reason is simply that there is nothing but this which constitutes neural activity of the type 
through which things can be presented. 1t is not possible， for instance， to present a 
hippopotamus， a bus， or a fire through itseH， because none of these things constitutes 
neural activity. 1t is not possible to present neural activity of a di妊erenttype through 
itself because it does not constitute neural activity of the requisit巴 type. This circumstance 
gives rise to the impression that everything in the universe， including neural activity of 
the special type in question here， forms one realm， a complete one， solid as it were， whi1e 
experience forms quite another， somehow incomplete and ethereal. This is an illusion. 
Everything in the universe including the neural activity in question does indeed form one 
realm (or it may be assumed that it does until cosmologists show that it doesn't in some 
way or other)， but experience does not form a separat巴 realmalongside the universe. 
The conclusions reached thus far carry straightforward implications for many often-
put questions. Let us consider j ust two. 
First， what is the difference between “the physical" and “the mental"? To begin 
with， itis necessary to decide whether the latter is to be taken to exclude or include 
subconscious events and processes. But either way， the answer is simple， so far as it can 
be given at present: The mental consists in neural activity of a certain type or types the 
nature of which remains for the most part to be discovered. One might feel tempted to 
give a different answer: that the mental consists in neural activity of the type or types in 




We judge whether old Fogerty or his pet cat is conscious， or more generally whether 
出eyhave experiences， as in sleep， by their behavior. But the behavior in qu巴stionis of 
a piece with neural activity of the type in question. That is， the neural activity and 
the behavior form the end-points of a continuous back-and-forth pro田 swherein through 
time each shapes the other in whole or in part. 1n fact， itis precisely because the 
behavior is of a piece with the neural activity that it constitutes valid procedure to judge 
by it. 1n principle， itis safer to judge by the neural activity， for it is the same thing as 
the experience， whereas the behavior， or that which an observer takes to be the relevant 
behavior， issomething diverse and hence might prove to be an unreliable basis for 
judgment. 1t has come about that we judge by the behavior and not the neural activity 
because in several important ways the former but not the latter is open to observation. 
Perhaps， however， itis best to state the case as follows: At bottom， to judge by 
Fogerty's behavior whether he has experiences， and to judge by the neural activity in hi'S 
brain whether he has experiences， and， by extension， to judge by “n巴uralacti vity" whe-
ther the computer has experiences， is not to follow two much less three different proce-
dures. At bottom， itis to follow one and the same procedure， and this procedure is 
either valid in al three cases or invalid in al three. 1t is， of course， valid. 
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